Non-Listed Real Estate Risk Factors

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
Structure

- Overview
- Descriptive Analysis
- Model Results
- Practical Implications
- Concluding Remarks


Overview


- Objectives of the research:
 - Analysis of non-listed real estate fund return risk factors
 - Comparison with listed real estate and direct real estate (ongoing analysis)
- Data sources:
 - INREV: Non-listed real estate funds
 - IPD: Direct real estate indices
 - Datastream: Listed companies, macroeconomic and market data
- Coverage:
 - Countries: UK, NL, GE, FR, IT
 - Sectors: Retail, Office, Residential, Industrial, Other
 - 2001 2014 period (annual data)
- Model:
 - Panel data analysis with 1,162 fund-year observations






Sector Breakdown for Non-Listed Funds










Total Return by Country

➤ The sample average yearly total return is 2.4% with a volatility of 17.5%.


Across countries:

- No diff. in mean
- Diff. in volatility
- ➤ Diff in skew. & all < 0
- Diff in kurt. & all fattailed




Total Return by Sector

- Tests indicate that Industrial and Office sectors have lower total return than Retail on average.
- Same conclusion on other distribution moments as for countries:
 - Diff. in volatility
 - ➤ Diff in skew. & all < 0
 - Diff in kurt. & all fattailed







Model Results

Impact of specific characteristics on total return:

Non-listed funds:

$$TR =$$

$$+4.03 \cdot \text{size}$$

$$-0.96 \cdot \text{size}^2$$

$$+0.52 \cdot \text{gearing}$$

$$-0.01 \cdot \text{gearing}^2$$

+7.84 · Open End|subprime

-3.84 · Value-Added|post-subprime

Listed companies:

$$TR =$$

$$-0.65 \cdot \text{size}^2$$

$$+0.64 \cdot \text{gearing}$$

$$-0.01 \cdot \text{gearing}^2$$

Model Results

Impact of macro and market factors:

Non-listed funds:

TR =

 $+2.49 \cdot \text{real GDP growth}$

 $+4.93 \cdot inflation$

-6.80 · unexpected inflation

 $-0.01 \cdot 10Y$ real int. rate

 $+0.43 \cdot \text{real M1}$ growth

 $+0.24 \cdot \text{real stock returns} \mid UK, FR, IT$

Listed companies:

TR =

 $+6.05 \cdot \text{real GDP growth}$

 $-2.84 \cdot inflation$

+ 20.96 · unexpected inflation

 $-0.02 \cdot 10$ Y real int. rate

 $+2.63 \cdot \text{real M1}$ growth |GE|

+ 0.50 · real stock returns

Model Results

Differences by sector:


- No difference between sectors for non-listed real estate funds.
- For listed companies
 - Residential better than others in "normal" periods (13%)
 - Office & residential worse than others during crisis (-25%)

Differences by country:

- Germany better than others before subprime crisis
- France and Italy better than others during and after crisis


Practical Implications

Impact of Gearing on Excess Total Return during Normal Cycle and Crisis



Practical Implications

Impact of Real GDP Growth for Core and Value-Added Funds



Concluding Remarks

- Attention should be paid to the following variables:
 - Real GDP growth
 - Long term real interest rate variation
 - Real money supply growth
 - Stock market real return
 - Inflation

Concluding Remarks

- Investors should consider advantages provided by several characteristics of non-listed funds:
 - Size
 - Results suggest an optimal size of around €bn 2
 - Gearing
 - Results suggest an optimal gearing level with respect to the cycle phase
 - 10% during crisis
 - 55% otherwise
 - Impact of gearing is also slightly more pronounced for value-added compared to core funds
 - Core investment style
 - More stable, it allows higher return of 4% on average than value-added in post crisis period
 - Open end structure
 - Allows for more flexibility, it delivers on average 8% more performance than closed end structure during crisis

Thank you for your attention